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Abstract 
Globally, over 150 billion cubic metres of associated gas are being flared and vented annually. Africa flares 40 
billion cubic metres annually in which 35 billion cubic metres are flared in sub-Saharan Africa. In Nigeria alone, 
gas flaring amounts to about 23 billion cubic metres per annum in over 100 flare sites, constituting over 13 percent 
of global gas flaring. This translates to greenhouse gas emission of 45 million tons of CO2 out of the global total 
of 400 million tons annually. Nigeria partners with the GGFR, a World Bank led public-private partnership that 
includes major oil and gas producing countries and companies. The GGFR was established to facilitate and support 
national efforts to utilize currently flared gas by promoting effective regulatory framework and tackling the 
constraints on gas utilization. The study essentially adopts qualitative method that relies on secondary data and 
applies radical environmentalism a combination of Marxism, rentierism and environmentalism as theoretical 
framework of analysis. The paper focuses primarily on the role of Nigeria in the GGFR vis a vis other partners; 
and thus, concludes that oil dependence of GGFR partners undermines the enforcement of associated gas flaring 
and venting reduction and elimination policy in Nigeria. 
Keywords: Oil, gas flaring, radical environmentalism, World Bank, GGFR, Nigeria 
 
Introduction 
Globally, over 150 billion cubic metres of natural gas are being flared and vented annually equivalent of 25 percent 
of the United States’ gas consumption or 30 percent of the European Union’s gas consumption, or more than the 
combined gas consumption of Central and South America, and amount to approximately 30.6 billion dollars. Out 
of this volume of national gas flared and vented globally, Africa contributes 40 billion cubic meters annually in 
which 35 billion cubic metres are flared in sub-Saharan Africa alone equivalent to half the continent’s power 
consumption. Fewer than 20 countries account for more than 70 percent of gas flaring and venting, and just four 
countries put together flare about 70 billion cubic metres of associated gas, annually (Kaldany, 2006; Aniche 
2015a). 
Flaring of associated gas emits a greenhouse gas (GHG) which contributes to global warming and climate 
change. Indeed flaring of associated gas contributes to global emissions of GHGs with flaring emissions currently 
estimated at about 400 million tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year. Flaring and venting of gas in 
petroleum production, therefore, wastes a valuable energy resource worth approximately 30.6 billion dollars each 
year, harms the environment and as well contribute to a global climate change by adding some 400 million tons of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) in annual emissions (Ismail and Umukoro, 2012). Although, the environmental effect of gas 
flaring is transboundary in terms of global warming and climate change, it has some negative effects on the 
immediate environment leading to local and global concerns. 
In Nigeria alone, gas flaring amounts to about 23 billion cubic metres per annum of the gas generated in 
association with crude oil production in over 100 flare sites, constituting over 13 percent of global gas flaring, 
which translates to GHG emissions of 45 million tons CO2 equivalent out of the global total of 400 million tons. 
Consequently, Nigeria has lost about $ 72 billion in revenue for the period between 1970 and 2006 or about $ 2.5 
billion annually on the average for flaring associated gas (Aniche, 2014). Nigerian government has set various 
deadlines for elimination of gas flaring but none of these zero gas flaring deadlines has been achieved. Even before 
the formation of GGFR in 2002, a number of efforts have been made by the Nigerian government to reduce gas 
flaring with little progress (Agboola, et al, 2011; Kingston, 2011). GGFR is assisting Nigeria in achieving gas flare 
out, or at least, significantly reducing gas flaring since 2003. The objective of this study is to assess the role of 
Nigerian state and NNPC in the World Bank GGFR towards enforcement of associated gas flaring reduction and 
elimination policy in Nigeria.   
 
An Overview of the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) Initiative 
The GGFR was launched by World Bank in 2002 in collaboration with Norway at a conference titled World 
Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa in August 2002. GGFR is made up of 
country partners, oil and gas multinational partners and international organizations including international non-
governmental organizations of which Nigeria and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) are partners 
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(see Table 1 below). Actually, Nigeria joined the GGFR partnership at the inception in 2002 as a pioneer member. 
GGFR partnership involves oil producing countries, including Nigeria state-owned oil companies called NNPC, 
major international oil companies (IOCs) and international organizations such as the World Bank and Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). NNPC represents other oil and gas multinational operators in Nigeria 
as part of the joint venture partnership arrangement. Together, the Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partner 
countries contribute over 70% of the global gas flaring (Aniche, 2015b). 
The World Bank led Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnership initiative is one of the 
international initiatives aimed at significantly reducing global gas flaring and venting which stood at over 150 
billion cubic metres per annum between 2002 and 2005. Nigeria as one of the World Bank GGFR partners 
contributes about 13% of total global gas flaring amounting to over 23 billion cubic metres enough to meet 
Nigeria’s total energy needs. The World Bank GGFR is assisting partners like Nigeria in significantly reducing 
their contributions to global gas flaring through promoting effective regulatory frameworks and tackling the 
constraints on gas utilization (Aniche, 2014). 
In 2010, the partnership achieved a milestone with satellite data estimating a 9% drop in gas flaring 
globally. Between 2009 and 2010, there was a reduction from 147 billion cubic metres (bcm) to 138 bcm despite 
a two billion barrels-a-day increase in crude oil production over the same period translating to a roughly 15% drop 
in gas flaring intensity since 2002. Also, between 2005 and 2011, gas flaring decreased by approximately 20% 
from 172 bcm to 140 bcm based on satellites estimate commissioned by GGFR. This amounts to 32 bcm decrease 
roughly equivalent to 85 million tons of CO2 emissions (Svensson and Rios, 2012).  
However, the remaining 140 bcm of associated gas flared in 2011 globally amounts to 360 million tons 
of CO2 emissions and equivalent to almost one-third of European Union’s annual natural gas consumptions. It is 
perhaps pertinent to note that most of these estimated reductions were recorded in Nigeria, Russia and Kazakhstan 
where public and private stakeholders have increased investment in associated gas utilization projects. Yet Russia 
and Nigeria still top the list of twenty most flaring countries in 2011 (Aniche, 2015b). 
The GGFR partners aim to overcome the barriers to gas flaring reduction by sharing international best 
practices and implementing country-specific programs. As such, the GGFR partners established a collaborative 
and voluntary global standard for gas flaring reduction known as the Voluntary Standard. The voluntary standard 
provides a framework for governments, companies and other stakeholders to consult each other in collaborative 
actions on projects across two or more countries to reduce barriers to associated gas utilization (see Table 2 below). 
The GGFR partners are determined to avoid flaring from new oil projects and to eliminate continuous production 
flaring unless where no economic alternatives exist (Svensson and Rios, 2012). 
Some of these barriers to gas flare reduction include the high cost of gathering and utilizing the associated 
gas, undeveloped domestic gas markets and limited access to international markets, lack of financing of gas 
infrastructure, poor regulatory frameworks and inefficient gas pricing systems mainly due to subsidies 
(Christiansen and Haugland, 2001; Dayo, 2008; Ogbara, 2009; Oluduro, 2011). The GGFR helps countries and 
companies overcome these barriers by focusing on commercialization of associated gas through identification of 
potential uses, regulatory framework for flaring and venting, implementation of the Voluntary Global Standard for 
flaring and venting reduction, capacity building for obtaining carbon credits for financing flaring and venting 
reduction projects (World Bank, 2004a). 
Global Gas Venting and Flaring Reduction Voluntary Standard which was endorsed by GGFR partners 
in May 2002 outlines a plan of action for gas flaring reduction and elimination including adoption within one year 
by partner countries and companies. The Voluntary Global Standard is complemented by the CDM. The CDM 
stimulates investments in gas flaring reductions and associated gas utilization (GGFR, 2004; World Bank, 2005). 
However, CDM is limited by financial viability threshold even when it is tailored to the special needs of 
commercial gas flaring reduction projects with acceptable economic rate of return factoring social costs of CO2 
emission reduction. For current gas flaring reduction CDM, see Table 3 below.  
In addition, World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund was meant to help lower the costs of effective upstream 
and downstream gas flaring projects. The Fund is designed to finance projects that can be expected to receive 
credits for reducing GHGs under the various Kyoto mechanisms like clean development mechanism (CDM) 
and Joint Implementation (JI) (see Table 4 below). Most oil companies complained that impact of these green 
financing mechanisms on project economics was marginal though they admitted that in some cases the 
mechanisms could enable the project to meet the required threshold. Most flaring reduction projects hardly 
meet the standards of an emission reduction project under one of the Kyoto mechanisms, and thus, received 
little attention in the context of the Protocol. The toughest hurdle seems to be additionality test meaning that 
the projects sponsors would have to show that emissions reductions engendered by the project would not 
otherwise have occurred. This is a challenge to countries like Nigeria and companies like NNPC that already 
have formulated policies for gas flaring elimination (Aniche, 2015c). 
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Radical Environmentalism and the Contradictions of GGFR Partnerships 
This study is predicated on radical environmentalism. Our own brand of environmental radicalism is a blend of 
rentierism, Marxism and environmentalism (Aniche, 2014). Marxism demonstrates that the driving force of 
capitalism is not human need or social welfare or even consumer choice but the need for profit and accumulation 
of capital. The capitalists are compelled by competition to maximize profits and accumulation of surplus value. 
The inevitable logical outcome of concentration of capital is competition. Another logical outcome of the 
concentration of capital or capital accumulation is international competition between states acting in the interest 
of their respective capitalist class. This means that the world’s highest energy consumers such as US, China, 
Europe, etc. face each other as competitors (Molyneux, 2010). 
A rentier state is a term used to classify those states which derive all or a substantial portion of their 
revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients and the creating in the same process a rentier 
mentality and a rentier class in these states (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Mahdavy, 1990). The four basic 
characteristics of a rentier state which are (a) rent situations must predominate in that there is no such thing as a 
pure rentier economy (b) the rent must come from abroad or outside the country (c) in a rentier state only the few 
(i.e. the rentier class) are engaged in the generation of rent while the majority is involved in its distribution and 
consumption meaning that the government functionaries or political leaders (i.e. rentier class) make the deals and 
take in the revenue, and then allocate to the public that is not involved in creation of wealth and (d) the government 
must be the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy meaning that the rents accrue to the government 
directly (Beblawi, 1990). The implications of the above characterization is that rentierism often transforms rentier 
states into mono-product or mono-cultural economies where (i) the little productive activities are mainly confined 
at the level of primary production necessary for oil exploration (ii) there is predominance of public sector over 
private sector (iii) there is in the private sector the dominance of informal sector over formal sector (Beblawi, 1990; 
Okeke and Aniche, 2013; Ifesinachi and Aniche, 2014; Okafor and Aniche, 2014). 
Environmentalism advocates for the lawful preservation, conservation, restoration and improvement of 
the natural environment, ecology or surroundings of living things.  Environmentalism is concerned with 
environmental protection, environmental security, environmental concerns, and improvement of the environmental 
health. Environmentalism deals with issues of global warming, greenhouse gas emission, climate change, etc. 
(McCormick, 1995; de Steiguer, 2006; Woodhouse 2009; Bakari, 2013). Environmentalists prioritize 
environmental costs over and above economic or monetary costs, environmental security over energy security. 
Environmentalists believe that human interference with nature should be restricted or minimized as a matter of 
urgency for the sake of living things or the earth. Eco-socialists, a blend of Marxism and environmentalism, attack 
the gulf between the two varieties of environmentalism. The environmentalism of the North, an aesthetic 
environmentalism that is the privilege of wealthy people who no longer have basic natural concerns and the 
environmentalism of the South, where people’s local environment is a source of communal wealth as a matter of 
survival (Kutting, 2004; Custers, 2005; Parenti, 2005).  
Thus, radical environmentalism emanating from the blend of Marxism, rentierism and environmentalism 
sees capitalism as a source of resource depletion and environmental degradation. The analytical utility and 
explanatory usefulness of the radical environmentalism in this study perhaps stem from the fact that it more than 
any other theory capture the very essence of global environmental politics and as well the fundamental and primary 
concerns of the World Bank led Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partners. Environmental radicalism thus 
have high analytical and explanatory value in that it is adequate and apt for explaining the four major issues in this 
study. 
Perhaps the failure of enforcement of associated gas flaring reduction and elimination policy in Nigeria 
despite the country’s role in the World Bank GGFR partnerships is captured by the six main contradictions of 
GGFR partnerships as identified by radical environmentalism such as (i) contradiction between capital and 
environment or between development of productive forces of the society and the environment (ii) contradiction 
between rents and environment or between profits and environment (iii) conflict between economic development 
and sustainable development or between economic growth and environmental protection, (iv) tension between 
national security and environmental security, (v) contradiction between economic diplomacy and environmental 
diplomacy, and (vi) conflict between global energy concerns and global environmental concerns or between global 
energy security and global environmental security (Aniche 2015a; Ifesinachi and Aniche, 2016).  
For example, contradiction between capital and environment and conflict between economic development 
and sustainable development as well as contradiction between economic diplomacy and environmental diplomacy, 
explain why the World Bank led Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnership is preoccupied with defending 
global capitalism by ensuring adoption of neo-liberal approaches like carbon financing, carbon credit, clean 
environment initiative and other neo-liberal strategies otherwise known as Washington Consensus such as public-
private partnership, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, etc., to reduce gas flaring. This is to ensure 
undisrupted increase in world crude oil production and supply chain necessary for preventing global capitalism 
from imminent collapse. The consequence of increasing world crude oil supply is increasing gas flaring in mainly 
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net-exporting oil producing or oil revenue dependent countries like Nigeria, because increase in oil production is 
not tied to increase in the capacity of associated gas gathering and utilization facilities. Moreso, the World Bank 
led Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnership does not really believe in gas flare out regime, but rather 
believes in gradual reduction or flare down. This coupled with its insistence on neo-liberal approaches and 
strategies for reducing gas flaring had not been effective in assisting Nigeria to achieve its zero-gas flaring deadline. 
Consequently, Orenstein (2010:7) describes the World Bank as: 
The World Bank Group is an institution of contradictions. It is a major climate polluter whose 
loans help lock developing countries into carbon-intensive development paths for decades, yet 
it wants to play a leading role in mitigating that same pollution. Though the World Bank is 
supposed to help developing countries alleviate poverty, its practices often hurt the poor and 
help entrench the powerful. People in developing countries are already being forced to adapt to 
the impacts of the pollution the Bank helps cause, while development gains are undercut by the 
climate crisis. And while the institution views itself as a defender of developing country interests, 
the World Bank remains a political tool used by developed countries in United Nations climate 
negotiations to maintain control over international climate finance. As the world grapples with 
the scope of the climate crisis, the World Bank Group - on its own and at the behest of many 
developed countries - is asserting itself to play a key role in controlling funding for developing 
countries to adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change and to mitigate, or reduce, 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
In the same vein, the contradiction between development of productive forces of the society and the 
environment, and as well as the conflict between global energy security and global environmental security, explain 
the reason why the Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) importing oil partner countries are concerned more with 
increase in world oil supply from net-exporting oil partner countries than in their effort to reduce gas flaring. This 
is because for most of these importing oil partner countries, the need for increasing world oil supply necessary for 
achieving short-term global energy security is more fundamental or important than global environmental security. 
In other words, the importing oil partner countries place much emphasis on global energy security at the expense 
of global environmental security in order to sustain their level of industrialization, economic growth and 
development and avoid collapse of their economies. Consequently, global environmental security can be sacrificed 
in the altar of global energy security or economic growth and development. The implication is that so long as the 
importing (GGFR) partner countries demand an increasing crude oil from net-exporting partner countries like 
Nigeria without recourse to improving the capacity of associated gas utilization capacity, the reduction in gas 
flaring in Nigeria will continue to be minimal or insignificant not to talk of meeting flare out deadline (Aniche, 
2014).  
Also, contradiction between rents and environment, conflict between economic growth and 
environmental protection and tension between national security and environmental security or security of the local 
population living in the immediate environment, explain the reason why the Nigerian state is concerned with 
increase in oil production and revenues more than the environmental harmful effects of gas flaring to the immediate 
environment in the Niger Delta. Due to the rentierism or rentier character of the Nigerian state and the associated 
rentier mentality of the Nigeria rentier class, Nigeria places more importance on collection of oil revenues accruing 
as rents or royalties more than on protecting the environment of oil communities in the Niger-Delta. Most of the 
oil exporting countries like Nigeria are rentier states, and as such oil-revenue-dependent. The import of this is that 
a country that depends largely on oil revenue to offset its expenditure cannot in all sincerity enforce zero gas flaring 
deadline in oil and gas multinationals. The major concern of the Nigerian state is to achieve economic growth and 
development through higher oil production and revenue without recourse to the capacity of associated gas 
utilization facility at the expense of oil communities (Aniche, 2015b). 
Finally, the contradiction between capital and environment and contradiction between profits and 
environment, explain the reason why the Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnering oil and gas 
multinationals are driven by desire to sustain competitive edge over their competitors through increasing oil 
production in Nigeria in order to make more profits at the expense of the oil communities. The GGFR partnering 
oil and gas multinationals place priority on profits through increasing oil production more than on environmental 
protection. Thus, their major preoccupation has been on how to develop cutting edge technology to enhance oil 
recovery from oil wells and to increase deep water drilling than on developing sophisticated technology to increase 
the capacity of associated gas gathering facilities in Nigeria. The point being made is that the GGFR partnering oil 
and gas multinationals are more concerned with maximizing profits through improved and efficient crude oil 
production in Nigeria than developing or improving the capacity of associated gas gathering and processing 
facilities to meet the zero gas flaring deadline. In other words, the GGFR partnering oil and gas multinationals 
operating in Nigeria would not be able to meet any future gas flare out deadline so long as they are more 
preoccupied with the drive to sustain their competitive edge over their rivals through increase in oil production 
and profit maximization (Aniche, 2014). 
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From the foregoing therefore radical environmentalism is able to make us understand that the fundamental 
concern of the World Bank led Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partners is increase in crude oil production 
though for different reasons. For examples, the reason for World Bank is to promote, preserve, protect and defend 
global capitalism, or to prevent global capitalism from imminent collapse that may arise from the shortfall in crude 
oil supply or crude oil supply-demand gap or short-term shortfall in energy supply. This is evident in the fact that 
development and sustenance of global capitalism depends on global energy security. For Global Gas Flaring 
Reduction (GGFR) importing partner countries the reason is increase in crude oil supply needed to achieve global 
energy security, economic growth and development, and sustain industrialization. For Global Gas Flaring 
Reduction (GGFR) net-exporting countries like Nigeria, the reason is increase in oil revenues defined as national 
security, economic growth and development. Finally, for Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) partnering oil 
and gas multinationals in Nigeria, the reason is to increase or maximize profits, and development of productive 
forces of the society (Aniche, 2015a). In summary, there is contradiction between national or specific interest and 
global interest otherwise known as the tragedy of the commons.  
 
The Role of Nigeria in GGFR 
Gas flaring began in Nigeria under the British colonial rule when Shell began oil exploration and production soon 
after oil was discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri, now in Bayelsa State in 1956. In Nigeria, the gas flare 
emission limits are determined within the maximum associated gas emission levels for all upstream operations as 
set by the government. Nigeria like other GGFR countries regulates gas flaring and venting through primary and 
secondary legislations. However, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) which supposed to provide a coordinated 
primary legislation for regulatory framework is yet to be passed by the National Assembly. The World Bank GGFR 
provides three main regulatory approaches for achieving flaring and venting reductions such as prescription, 
performance-based and hybrid approaches (Aniche, 2015b). 
For instance, the prescriptive approach is based on specific and detailed gas flaring and venting 
regulations established by the regulator and to be met by operators. Detailed prescriptions of regulatory procedures 
and operational processes clarify what is required and how is to be achieved by the operators. Stringent 
enforcement procedures provide operators with incentives to comply with gas flaring and venting regulations. In 
theory, this approach, makes it relatively easy for the regulator to set targets and determine whether operators are 
meeting the gas flaring and venting requirements. In practice, imposing detailed technical regulations on gas flaring 
and venting is challenging and complicated. As a result, measuring flare and vent volumes and monitoring 
compliance on each oil production site may be impracticable and costly (World Bank, 2004b).     
The performance-based approach places a greater emphasis on consensus and cooperation between the 
regulator and the operators in setting gas flaring and venting reduction targets or elimination deadlines. Thus, most 
GGFR countries opt for a more performance-based approach to achieve flaring and venting reduction targets. It is 
then the responsibility of the operators to define strategies for achieving these targets and provide evidence to 
show that they are complying with the agreement. To be effective, the regulator still requires enforcement powers 
to ensure compliance. Hybrid approach is therefore a combination, a mixture or a synthesis of prescriptive and 
performance-based approaches. In practice, the boundary between prescriptive and performance-based approaches 
is blurred (World Bank, 2004b). Some GGFR countries like Nigeria that have adopted effective or strict gas flaring 
and venting regulations often use a hybrid approach. Nigeria has as a matter of necessity adopted a hybrid approach 
due to dominance of joint venture partnerships between the NNPC and oil majors in which, the former is the 
regulator, investor and de facto operator. But despite adopting hybrid approach, Nigeria has not been able to 
effectively enforce zero gas flaring policy as demonstrated by various indices below.  
No matter the approach adopted to establish an efficient regulatory regime, two key areas must be 
addressed such as operational processes and regulatory procedures. Operational processes help to ensure that 
environmental, health and safety standards are being met when operators flare and vent associated gas. Put 
differently, the main function of technical regulation is to specify operational processes to ensure that 
environmental, health and safety standards are being met when operators flare and vent associated gas. Operational 
standards and guidelines typically include such aspects as burning technologies and practices in which equipment 
and operating processes may be specified to ensure burning of ‘clean’ gas and efficient combustion such as timing, 
siting or location, heat and noise generation, and smoke and noxious odours (World Bank, 2002).   
It is through timing that maximum duration of continuous flaring may be limited. Flare location or site 
suggests that the flare typically will have to be located at a safe distance from other facilities, accommodation units 
and populated areas. In heat and noise generation, upper limits may be set at specified distances from flaring 
operations. In the case of smoke and noxious odour, limits may be imposed on the opacity of smoke generated by 
flaring. An efficient burning or flaring of associated gas does not produce visible smoke. Black smoke from a flare 
indicates incomplete combustion (World Bank, 2004b).  
On the other hand, regulatory procedures refer to a regulator’s ability to monitor gas flaring and venting 
operations at oil production sites, measure actual flare and vent volumes, and enforce compliance with operational 
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guidelines. An operator’s compliance with flaring and venting guidelines depends mainly on the effectiveness of 
the regulatory procedures. Most GGFR oil producing net-export countries like Nigeria that adopted operational 
processes for gas flaring and venting lack effective regulatory procedures for monitoring, measuring and enforcing. 
Yet many of them have not established any operational requirements for gas flaring and venting.  
In Nigeria, the regulatory framework requires that a maximum sterilized approach distance of 60 metres 
radius measured from the base of the stack shall be maintained and no other equipment except that related to the 
flare shall be located within this area. The allowable heat radiation at ground level is 6.31 kw/m2 during maximum 
flaring at a distance of 60 metres from the base of the flame. It is also specified that the noise levels for unprotected 
ears shall be well within the threshold of pain between 80 and 100 acoustic decibels (World Bank, 2002).  
Regulatory gas flaring and venting procedures refer to dealings among the institutions or agencies that 
regulate gas flaring and venting, the operators, and other interested parties. Gas flaring and venting regulatory 
procedures are given legal effect, binding on all parties, pursuant to powers of the regulatory authority provided 
in relevant primary and secondary legislations. Gas flaring and venting procedures must be made public to help 
achieve the objective of openness and transparency. Openness refers to the ability to take part in a proceeding 
while transparency is ability to understand policies, laws, regulations, and related decision making procedures. 
Regulatory gas flaring and venting procedures refer mainly to the following procedures like applications and 
approval, measuring and reporting, and monitoring and enforcing (World Bank, 2004b). 
Some of the efforts of Nigerian government in implementing GGFR initiatives include legal and 
regulatory frameworks, fiscal and economic incentives, international engagements and initiatives, and setting of 
zero gas flaring deadlines. In line with GGFR initiatives, Nigerian government had enacted several laws for 
curbing gas flaring namely the 2004 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act, and finally, the 2010 
Associated Gas Re-injection Bill. Yet oil multinationals continue to flare gas in spite of these gas flaring regulatory 
regimes, either because the laws are defective or that they are not properly implemented or enforced (Malumfashi, 
2007; Aghalino, 2009; Ukala, 2011).  
Recently, the Nigerian government introduced another authority or body called the Presidential 
Implementation Committee on CDM (PIC CDM) as the body to organize CDM activities in Nigeria. Also, the PIC 
CDM has been named the Designated National Authority (DNA) as required by the UNFCCC and as defined in 
the Marrakech Accords. In this capacity, the PIC CDM has complete responsibility for CDM activities, especially 
in areas where government intervention and activities are expected. Thus, the DNA is expected among other things 
to promote CDM projects in Nigeria; provide clear and flexible procedures for review and approval of CDM 
projects; provide documentation and communication portals that give clear information to project proponents and 
investors (both buyers of Certified Emission Reduction CERs and/or financials of the project) on the necessary 
steps or procedures to have an approved CDM project in Nigeria; provide clear guidance on national sustainability 
criteria that should be taken into consideration in developing CDM projects; write Letters of Approval (LoA) for  
projects being sent to Executive Board for review and other CDM project cycle activities, after the DNA must 
have carried out some reviews of the proposed CDM project; and keep a registry of CDM projects in the pipeline 
in Nigeria (ICF International, 2006). 
Nigerian government is also engaging World Bank in its efforts to reduce and eliminate gas flaring. World 
Bank happens to be managing over $1 billion funds for carbon purchase. Subsequently, in June 28, 2005, the 
World Bank approved a credit for the National Energy Development Project in Nigeria. The project facilitates 
preparatory work required to launch the main domestic transmission gas pipeline from the South to the North of 
Nigeria and related gas-to-power generator projects. Since then, World Bank has been assisting Nigeria directly 
and indirectly in gas flaring reduction. Apart from carbon financing, the World Bank assisted Nigeria in drafting 
its National Gas Master Plan and Natural Gas Strategy Study, Downstream Gas Bill and Fiscal Regime for Gas 
Bill (Ibikunle, 2006). For information on World Bank carbon financing to Nigeria see Table 5 below. 
Nigerian government has been collaborating with the GGFR in its efforts to achieve gas flare out. These 
collaborations are in the areas of domestic gas sector policy; integration of operator plans; gas to power sector 
reform and implementation of the gas to power franchise model; financing of common infrastructure projects; 
small scale gas utilization; and use of CDM to obtain carbon credits for flare reduction projects. The GGFR has 
been involved in the preparation of Nigeria Gas Master Plan and Energy Sector Reform which include economic 
and financial viability of the gas pipelines. GGFR is also assisting Nigeria in carrying out gas pipeline engineering 
study and support to the implementation of the legal and regulatory framework for the gas sector and energy 
pricing study (Ifesinachi and Aniche, 2015). 
As part of the larger effort to assist Nigeria in its efforts to reduce gas flaring and venting, the GGFR 
hosted a workshop in Nigeria, first of a series. The key aim of the workshop was to support the designing of 
financial mechanisms for gas flaring reduction projects including assisting Nigeria in obtaining carbon credit 
financing. The workshop helped build CDM capacity among project developers and national authorities leading 
to a viable pilot project. Already two projects benefited from CDM through GGFR partnership. For example, 
Kwale-Okpai IPP utilizes associated gas from five fields for power generation with a capacity of 480 megawatts 
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using 140 mmscf/d, while Afam IPP with a capacity of 650 MW utilizes 190 mmscf/day. Another project that may 
be considered is Obiafu-Obrikom Gas injection project involving the reinjection of between 270-350 mmscf/d 
with a potential to delay the release of the equivalence of 2.46 million tons of CO2/year to the atmosphere (Ibikunle, 
2006). For information on GGFR’s flaring reduction demonstration projects from carbon finance in Nigeria, see 
Table 6 below. 
Nigeria is one of the GGFR partners that has endorsed a voluntary standard to eliminate venting and 
reduce flaring significantly within five to ten years by finding commercial uses for the associated gas through 
increased collaboration between countries. The Standard’s initial goal for flaring and venting is “no continuous 
flaring and venting of associated gas, unless there are no feasible alternatives”. Today, the Nigerian government 
is implementing the GGFR’s voluntary standard for reducing global gas flaring and venting with the goal of 
reducing barriers to the utilization of associated gas through markets and infrastructure, commercialization of 
associated gas, strengthening of regulations, and trading of carbon credits (Buscu-Guven, Harriss and Hartzmark, 
2010).  
The voluntary standard recommends consistent use of mass and energy balances to estimate gas flare and 
vent volumes in the existing wells, and the installation of flow metres in newly developed wells and in existing 
facilities with large flare volumes. The GGFR also recommends continuous metering of the gas volume flared at 
the source or flare gas burners and the measurement of associated gas composition and heating values essential to 
determining green gas emission rates (Buscu-Guven, Harriss and Hartzmark, 2010). 
 
GGFR Partners’ Oil Dependence and the Failure of Enforcement of Gas Flaring Elimination Policy in 
Nigeria 
The GGFR partners like country partners, oil multinationals, etc., are apparently united by the need to ensure 
gradual flare out regime and environmental concerns, but actually both oil exporting or producing and oil 
consuming or importing partners have one interest in common, that is, to maintain or increase oil production or 
supply while ensuring gradual flare out policies though for different reasons. This is as a result of the fact that 
GGFR partners are oil-dependent. In other words, GGFR partnership is constituted by oil-dependent partners such 
as oil-revenue-dependent partners or net-exporting oil producing countries like Nigeria, etc. and their state-owned 
oil companies like NNPC; and oil-energy-dependent partners or (net)-importing (oil producing) countries and their 
privately owned oil companies operating transnationally. For example, the oil exporting partner countries in spite 
of rhetoric are much more interested in increasing its oil export revenue through increase oil production. Oil 
importing partner countries are much more concerned with energy security through increased global oil production 
or supply. Also, oil multinational partners are interested in maximizing profits through increased oil production. 
The emphasis of oil multinationals is on short-term economic or monetary benefits to themselves, and not social 
and environment benefits to the oil communities. Consequently, they sacrifice the environmental and health costs 
of flaring associated gas at the altar of short-term economic or monetary costs. Even the World Bank is working 
towards ensuring that global flare down will not jeopardize the level of oil production in order to prevent global 
economic crisis.  
For example, EU member states import half of their energy needs, and this is expected to rise to 65% by 
2030. Europe’s energy imports come primarily from Russia and the Middle East constituting approximately 70% 
of the world total energy consumption. In 2005, about 80% of the energy consumed within EU was from fossil 
fuels. Europe imports about 50% of its total energy supply slightly over 80% of it is oil. Europe dependence on 
imported energy sources is expected to grow substantially by 2020. The European Commission estimates suggest 
that if current trends continue, Europe will import 65% of its total energy requirements by 2030. GGFR partners 
like Russia, Norway, the Middle East and North Africa are the largest suppliers of EU energy. In 2005, Russia 
accounted for 29% of the EU’s oil imports (Gelb, 2006; Van Gennip 2006; Yersin, 2006; Baran, 2007: Belkin, 
2008).  
The last few years mark the highest rates of foreign oil imports in US history. Until recently, US consumes 
24% of the global oil supply while possessing only 2% of the world’s oil reserves. US has imported the majority 
of its crude oil supply since 1994 (Deutch, 2004). In 2008, the United States produced 1.8 billion barrels of crude 
oil domestically and imported over 3.6 billion barrels twice as much. Petroleum is the leading source of all energy 
supply in the United States at 39.8%, providing 96% of transportation fuel and 44% of industrial fuel. Not until 
recently, The United States imports the majority of its oil from Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Nigeria (Deutch and Schlesinger, 2006; Podesta and Ogden, 2007; Beddor et al, 2009). It is noteworthy to state 
that the OPEC members used to produce approximately half of US oil supply. Without any infrastructure changes, 
the United States may be forced to rely more on Venezuela, Russia, Middle Eastern and African countries for fuel 
(Waisley, 1998). 
EIA oil forecasts stated that the global incremental oil production capacity by 2020 is expected to be 
around 45 million barrels per day (mb/d), a 60% increase above 1999 levels. Africa, the former Soviet Union, 
Latin America and the Middle East with 8mb/d, 7.5mb/d, 6.5mb/d and 22mb/d; respectively, account for almost 
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all of the increase. Whilst other regions such as Asia, Europe and North America will have largely constant 
production. A major portion of the projected incremental oil production is from Saudi Arabia where the flaring 
ratio is one of the world’s lowest. Large increases is also expected from other Middle East countries with a high 
flaring ratio; and from Africa and the former Soviet Union with global high flaring ratios. Additional production 
capacity will as well come from new oil producing countries particularly in West Africa where there is no gas 
flaring history and markets for associated gas are not easy to develop. If existing regional ratios of gas flared to oil 
produced are maintained, the EIA forecasts for incremental oil production imply, increased levels of annual flaring 
of approximately 60% by 2020 (GGFR, 2004). 
As such, it is estimated that the dominance of oil in global energy supply chain will continue to 2020. For 
example, OPEC projects that world oil demand will rise by 20mb/d from 2008 to 2030, when it reaches almost 
106mb/d. Per capita oil use in developing countries will remain far below that of the developed countries. For 
instance, oil use per person in North America in 2030 will still be more than ten times that of South Asia. The 
projected demand figures, non-OPEC supply expectations, and the increase in non-crude OPEC supply suggest 
that the amount of OPEC crude required will continue to rise after the medium term period, reaching just over 
41mb/d by 2030. The share of OPEC crude in total by 2010 is 39% (Aniche, 2015a). 
Consequently, global oil production and consumption have increased tremendously with corresponding 
increase in gas flaring at least in absolute terms. For example, Nigeria has been able to reduce gas flaring in 
relative terms, but not in absolute terms due to increased oil production in the recent times following the 
improved security situation in the Niger Delta region of  the country. Thus, oil multinationals operating in 
Nigeria are increasingly developing new oil fields, rigs and wells without developing adequate gas utilization 
facilities for these oil fields. For information on total gas produced and flared (scf) 2001-2011, see Table 7 
below. 
The implication is that Nigeria has set various zero gas flaring deadlines, but has not been able to achieve any 
of them due to its inability to enforce compliance among the oil and gas multinationals operating in Nigeria 
in joint venture with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Bassey (2008) noted that the politics 
of gas flaring has seen the dates of ending gas flares being shifted as it suits the international oil corporations 
and the government. It has continuously been shifted from 2008 to 2009 to 2011 to 2012. For example, Table 
8 below shows the estimated gas flared volumes in billion centimetre (bcm) from satellite data in Nigeria 
from 2002 to 2011. 
Thus, despite some reductions in gas flare achieved by Nigerian government with the help of World Bank 
led Global Gas Flaring Reduction, the volume of gas flared in Nigeria is increasing in absolute terms due to 
increase in crude oil production, whilst possibility of ever achieving zero-gas flaring deadline remains remote. 
Varma (2008) thus noted that the global figures as well show a small or marginal decline in global gas flaring from 
157 billion cubic metres in 2006 to 147 billion cubic metres in 2007 even as some of these reductions are directly 
linked to gas flaring reduction efforts implemented in some GGFR partner countries around the world including 
Nigeria. 
The focus of this study remains to assess the role of the World Bank GGFR partnership on the failure of 
enforcement of zero gas flaring regime in Nigeria despite the country’s involvement in the initiative. From all 
indications therefore oil dependence of GGFR partners impedes the implementation of associated gas flaring 
reduction and elimination policy in Nigeria. In other words, Nigeria’s partnership with the World Bank GGFR 
initiative is an impediment to the enforcement of associated gas flaring reduction and elimination regime.   
 
Conclusion 
So far we have been able to appraise the role of Nigeria in the World Bank GGFR in implementing or enforcing 
associated gas flaring reduction and elimination regime. Thus, we noted that Nigeria through NNPC is partnering 
with GGFR to implement the Nigerian endorsed Voluntary Standard to eliminate venting and reduce flaring 
significantly within five to ten years by finding commercial uses for the associated gas (AG) through increased 
collaboration (Aniche 2015a). 
From the foregoing, the conclusion at which we arrive is that oil dependence of GGFR partners hinders 
the enforcement of associated gas flaring reduction and elimination policy in Nigeria. Thus, we have been able to 
demonstrate that this failure of enforcement of associated gas flaring reduction and elimination policy in Nigeria 
despite the World Bank GGFR partnerships is captured by the six main contradictions of GGFR partnerships as 
identified by radical environmentalism such as (i) contradiction between capital and environment (ii) contradiction 
between rents and environment (iii) conflict between economic growth and environmental protection, (iv) tension 
between national security and environmental security, (v) contradiction between economic diplomacy and 
environmental diplomacy, and (vi) conflict between global energy security and global environmental security 
(Aniche 2014). Perhaps, these contradictions are reflections of the tragedy of the commons or a condition of 
specific interest versus shared interest.  
What is to be done? The fundamental thing to do for Nigeria and other net-exporting oil producing and 
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oil-revenue-dependent countries is to diversify the revenue base of their economies necessary for reducing the 
excessive dependence on oil revenue by mainstreaming other domestic sources of revenue like direct tax as well 
as developing other sectors of the economy like manufacturing sector. The way forward for oil importing and oil-
energy-dependent countries is to harness other energy resources like renewable energy or seek alternative sources 
of energy such as clean energy, and diversify their energy needs in order to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels 
like oil. This is a far reaching solution to compel the IOCs to comply with the associated gas flaring reduction and 
elimination policy by drastically limiting oil production to the capacity of associated gas utilization facilities. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1: GGFR Partners, Countries, Oil Companies and Organizations  
Countries Oil Companies Organizations 
Algeria  BP  EU 
Angola  Chevron  OPEC 
Azerbaijan  Conoco Phillips  Wartsila  
Cameroon  Eni  WBG 
Canada (Donor)  Exxon Mobil   
Congo (Republic)  Kuwait Oil Corporation   
France  Marathon Oil   
Gabon  Maersk Oil and Gas   
Indonesia  NNPC   
Iraq  Norsk Hydro   
Kazakhstan  Pemex   
Kuwait  Qatar Petroleum  
Mexico  Shell  
Nigeria  SNH  
Norway (Donor)  SOCAR  
Qatar  Sonatrach  
Russian Federation  TOTAL  
United Kingdom (Donor) Statoil  
United States of America (Donor)   
Uzbekistan   
Source: Adapted from the World Bank Group (2011). Culled from Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology TPG 4140- Natural Gas Project Report, November 2012. 
 
Table 2: Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) Voluntary Standard 
A. Recommended Timeline Implementing the Voluntary Standard 
Recommended Actions   Number of Years from 
Endorsement   
Year for Existing 
Partners   
GGFR Steering Committee endorses the Standard     March 23, 2004   
Organizations and governments adopt the endorsed 
Standard 
1 year April 1, 2005   
Implement the initial goal for  flaring and venting for new 
projects   
1 year  April 1, 2005   
Implement the initial goal for venting existing facilities 2-4 years  January 1, 2006-2008 
Organizations and governments publicly report flaring 
and venting (if not currently reporting) 
2 years April 1, 2006 
Develop Associated Gas Recovery Plan:                     
Within operational project boundaries, or    2 years January 1, 2006               
With expanded project boundaries   3 years January 1, 2007 
Develop Country Implementation Plan 2-3 years January 1, 2006-2007    
Implement the initial goal for flaring and plan for existing 
projects (unless Plans indicate other timeframe): 
  
Within operational project boundaries, or 5 years January 1, 2010       
With expanded project boundaries    6 years January 1, 2011    
Source: Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR), 2002. 
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B. Flaring and Venting Activities Related to the Voluntary Standard 
Potential Sources of Venting Targeted under 
Initial Goal of 
Standard   
Targeted under 
Ultimate Goal of 
Standard    
Not Covered 
by Standard 
Continuous Production Venting    
Continuous venting due to lack of flaring facilities X   
Venting of production storage tank losses from:  
• Flashing 
• Working and breathing    
  
X 
X 
 
Gas-driven pneumatic devices    X  
Gas driven chemical injection pumps     X  
Gas treatment events       X 
Locally vented low pressure-rated systems 
include storage tanks or compressor ancillary 
systems that are typically vented locally in order 
to provide the lowest back-pressure possible      
  
 
 
X 
 
Non-continuous production venting           
Catalyst/mole sieve dryers     X  
Oil well completion, treatment, stimulation, 
workover, and testing    
  
X 
 
Surface casing gas (oil wells)    X  
Gas migration (oil wells)  X  
Operational venting used in order to bring the 
pressure in specific equipment items to 
“atmospheric level” for example compressor seal 
systems, pig launchers/receivers, chemical skids, 
and so forth.    
  
 
X 
 
Venting to clear vessels for personnel entry       X 
Well stimulation/venting/unloading (field 
venting)    
 X  
Source: Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR), 2002. 
 
C. Flaring Activities Subject to the Voluntary Standard 
Potential Sources of Flaring   Targeted under 
Initial Goal of 
Standard   
Targeted under 
Ultimate Goal of 
Standard   
Not 
Covered by 
Standard 
Continuous production flaring          
Non-safety flaring due to lack of 
processing facilities and/or marketing  
outlets 
 
X 
  
Non-continuous production flaring       
Compressor start-ups and shutdowns 
Well completion, treatment, stimulation, 
workover, and testing: 
 
 
X 
X  
• Short term (<30 days) 
• Long term (>30days)  
 
X 
X  
Early Production Facilities X   
Surface casing gas (oil wells)   X 
Gas Migration (oil wells)      X 
Flaring of production storage tank losses 
from:  
• Flashing 
• Working and breathing    
  
X 
 
Source: Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR), 2002. 
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Table 3: Current Gas Flaring Reduction CDM Projects  
Title Country KtCO2/Y 2012ktCO2 
Use of Recovered Gas for Methanol Production  Equatorial Guinea 2,356.03 23,560 
Recovery of AG Kwale Oil Gas Process Plant  Nigeria  1,496.93 10,521 
The Ovade Ogharefe Gas Capture and Processing Project  Nigeria  2,531.70 14,505 
A1-Shaheen Oil Field Gas Recovery and Utilization Project  Qatar 1,457.81 9,120 
Source: Gouvello (2011). Culled from Norwegian University of Science and Technology TPG 4140 – Natural Gas 
Project Report, November 2012. 
 
Table 4: GGFR Partner Countries and Projects  
Partner Countries Projects Carbon Credit Options 
Algeria  3 fields: Ohanet, TFT and In Amenas  Exploring carbon credits for the three 
fields  
Nigeria  2 projects: gas pipeline and gas to power  2 power projects: AFAM and Kwale 
Angola  Angola LNG  Angola LNG 
Cameroon  Rio del Rey pipeline to Limbe   
Equatorial Guinea  Zafiro pipeline to ELNG   
Chad  Sedigui   
Russia  Gas projects in Khanty-Mansiysk  Gas to Power Surgut, TNK-BP 
Indonesia To be developed  To be developed  
Source: Svensson, B. (2005). Gas Flaring Reduction Global Perspective. National Gas Star Program. Annual 
Implementation Workshop, October 25. 
 
Table 5: World Bank Credit Facilities to Nigeria  
Date Project Name Credit Facilities in $ 
June 28, 2005 National Energy Development Project (NEDP) 172 
August 06, 2007 National Energy Development Project (Carbon Offset) 5.87 
June 09, 2008 NG-Lagos Landfill Gas and Composing (FYO6) 2.13 
June 16, 2009 Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project (NEGIP) 200 
Source: World Bank Statistics, 2011. 
 
Table 6: GGFR’s Flaring Reduction Demonstration Project from Carbon Finance in Nigeria 
Company Project  Project Type CER/EUR y 
(k) 
CER/EUR 2012 
(k) 
Status Method 
Eni Kwale Gas-to-Power 1,513 10,540 Registered AM0009 
Shell Afam Gas-to-Power 740 3,700 Method 
submitted  
NM 
Eni ObOb Gas to 
Reinjection 
2,000 10,000 On hold  NM 
Source: GGFR-CFFS Committee Workshop, GGFR Brief, April 25, 2007. 
 
Table 7: Total Gas Produced and Flared (mscf) 2001-2011 
Year Gas Produced Gas Flared Percentage Gas Flared 
2001 1,822,922,111 920,905,671 50.52 
2002 1,651,591,488 744,108,036 45.65 
2003 1,830,302,769 847,614,682 46.31 
2004 2,082,283,189 886,070,555 42.55 
2005 2,093,628,859 812,332,777 38.80 
2006 2,182,432,084 799,998,369 36.66 
2007 2,140,274,706 659,368,435 30.81 
2008 2,282,440,395 617,618,876 27.06 
2009 1,837,278,307 509,351,905 27.72 
2010 2,392,838,898 581,568,354 24.30 
2011 2,400,402,880 619,032,858 25.79 
Source: NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010 and 2011. 
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Table 8: Nigeria’s Estimated Flared Volumes (in bcm) from Satellite Data, 2002-2011 
Year F14 F15 F16 F18 Average 
2002 21.1 21.0 - - 21.0 
2003 23.1 24.6 - - 23.8 
2004 - 21.9 23.4 - 22.6 
2005 - 20.0 22.5 - 21.3 
2006 - 17.6 19.7 - 18.6 
2007 - 15.5 17.0 - 16.3 
2008 - - 15.5 - 15.5 
2009 - - 14.9 - 14.9 
2010 - - - 15.2 15.0 
2011 - - - - 14.6 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Satellite Data, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
